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Abstract 
We develop a multi-country, multi-sector trade model with labor market frictions and 
equilibrium unemployment. Trade opening leads to a reduction in unemployment if it raises 
real wages and reallocates labor towards sectors with lower-than-average labor market 
frictions. We estimate sector-specific labor market frictions and trade elasticities using 
employment data from 25 OECD countries and worldwide trade data. We then quantify the 
potential unemployment and real wage effects of implementing the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and of eliminating 
trade imbalances worldwide The unemployment and real wage effects work in conflicting 
directions for some countries under some trade regimes, such as the US under TTIP. We 
introduce a welfare criterion that accounts for both effects and splits such ties. Accordingly, 
US welfare is predicted to decrease under TTIP and increase under TPP.  
Keywords: Labor market frictions, unemployment, trade 
JEL Classifications: F15; F16; F17; J64 
1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that trade usually raises real incomes. But does it create jobs? The current us
administration seems to believe so. In an opinion article published on January 15, 2015, Secretary of
State John Kerry wrote:
“Estimates are that the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] could provide $77 billion a year in
real income and support 650,000 new jobs in the U.S. alone.”1
By contrast, Peter A. Petri from the Peterson Institute rejects the very idea that trade has any aggregate
impact on employment, echoing Krugman (1993):
“Like most trade economists, we don’t believe that trade agreements change the labor force
in the long run. [...] Rather, trade agreements affect how people are employed, and ideally
substitute more productive jobs for less productive ones and thus raise real incomes.”2
We argue that there is some truth in both of these seemingly contradictory views and that trade may
simultaneously raise incomes and unemployment. We propose a framework to evaluate trade reforms
when society (governments or individuals) cares about both incomes and unemployment. Preferential
trade agreements or any other trade reform may affect the unemployment rate of a country via two
channels. First, if a trade shock results in efficiency gains in a country then this raises both real
incomes and – in the presence of labor market frictions – job creation in that country. Second, the
reallocation of the workforce itself may raise or diminish the equilibrium unemployment rate if labor
market frictions vary across sectors (and we find that they do).
In the first half of the paper, we develop our argument by designing a multi-sector, multi-country
general equilibrium trade model with labor market frictions and equilibrium unemployment. Our model
emphasizes both aforementioned channels whereby trade shocks such as preferential trade agreements
affect the aggregate unemployment rate of a country. The reallocation effect of a trade reform leads to
an increase in unemployment if it reallocates labor into sectors with higher-than-average labor market
frictions. The expansion effect is a general equilibrium effect whereby a trade reform, by boosting
allocative efficiency, may spur aggregate job creation, which in turn raises real wages and reduces
unemployment in all sectors. The multi-sector, multi-country design of our model emphasizes that the
reallocation and expansion effects of a preferential (i.e. discriminatory) trade agreement on the real
income and unemployment rate of a country depend on the set of countries and sectors included in the
agreement it is signing. It also opens the possibility that trade simultaneously raises real incomes and
unemployment when both effects work in conflicting directions.
1See http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/american-alliances-international-cooperation-by-
john-f--kerry-2015-01#4bxmfbYemSPg1fzI.99, accessed on October 30, 2015.
2See https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/01/30/the-obama-administrations-
illusionary-job-gains-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ accessed on October 30, 2015.
2
In the second half of the paper, we structurally estimate the parameters of the model using world
trade data for over 130 countries and sectoral employment and production data for 25 oecd countries
(henceforth oecd-25) over 2001-2008; a key contribution of the paper is to estimate sector-specific
labor market frictions from the oecd-25 production data in a theory-consistent way.3 Equipped with
this, we run a first counterfactual exercise, namely, we estimate the real wage and unemployment effects
for all countries in our sample of eliminating trade barriers including all (already mostly low) tariffs
between the us and the eu – as is the ostensible goal of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (henceforth ttip). We find that such elimination of trade barriers has minor and heterogeneous
unemployment and welfare effects on eu countries. In the us, total unemployment is predicted to rise
by 1.1% but real wages would also rise, by 0.3% on average; the net welfare effect is thus ambiguous
a priori. We introduce a welfare criterion that accounts for both real wage and unemployment effects
in order to resolve such ambiguity. According to our criterion, ttip is predicted to have a (minor)
negative effect on us welfare. As could be expected, the welfare, real wage, and employment effects of
ttip on non-participating oecd countries are usually negative and small. We then perform a similar
exercise for the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement, or tpp, as our second counterfactual
scenario. Again, we find that welfare increases for the member countries of our sample and decreases
– slightly – for the non-participating ones. Our final counterfactual scenario involves the removal of
trade imbalances. Here, real wage, unemployment, and welfare effects are much larger in magnitude
and also more heterogeneous than under the previous scenarios. The general pattern that emerges is
that surplus countries usually benefit from the removal of trade imbalances while deficit countries are
made worse off, as the recent Greek example illustrates vividly.
Designing a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium model of trade and equilibrium unem-
ployment is important for several reasons. First, trade economists tend to focus on the real wage
effects of trade, sometimes dismissing its unemployment effects as of second-order importance, even as
policymakers and the public at large tend to voice concerns about, and support for trade agreements in
terms of jobs gained or lost.4 By explicitly including search-and-matching labor market frictions in an
otherwise standard trade model, we take the concerns of the latter seriously. Specifically, we introduce
sector-specific Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching frictions, as modeled in the static
model of Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), into a multi-country Ricardian trade model a`-la Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012). As a result, equilibrium trade patterns
have non-trivial effects on equilibrium unemployment.
Second, we show that real wage and frictional unemployment effects are closely – but only imper-
fectly – correlated. Both the distinctions and the similarities between the two criteria are important.
3More precisely, we estimate one parameter per sector (µ), which is a combination of the sector-specific vacancy
cost (which encompasses training costs in our static model) and of the sector-specific matching tfp. We refer to this
parameter as the matching efficiency of the sector for short.
4See also e.g. Lu¨, Scheve, and Slaughter (2012) for evidence that labor market outcomes shape attitudes towards
trade in China and the us.
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Any reform that raises aggregate demand boosts job creation, which raises wages and reduces unemploy-
ment in all sectors (the expansion effect); thus, focusing on aggregate unemployment, as policymakers
tend to do, or on real incomes, as economists usually do, looks like looking at the same issue from two
different angles. But this misses the other half of the story whereby trade reforms reallocate resources
such as labor across sectors. This reallocation effect has an impact on a country’s unemployment rate if
sectors have heterogeneous labor market frictions. We design an estimation strategy to measure these
sector-specific labor market frictions in a theory-consistent way. The sector-specific coefficients that
we estimate encompass several sources of labor market frictions, including sector-specific training costs
(which are highly heterogeneous). We find substantial cross-sectoral variation in search-and-matching
frictions. As an external validity check, we find that such sector-specific frictions correlate well with
observed sectoral unemployment rates for which we have data (us manufactures).
Third, most existing studies on the labor market outcomes of the interaction of trade reforms with
labor market frictions estimate the transition effects (e.g. Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren 2010, Dix-
Carneiro 2014, Fajgelbaum 2013). Reallocating labor across sectors and firms takes time and several
workers become temporarily unemployed, some for a substantial amount of time.5 We complement
such studies by looking at the effects of trade on frictional unemployment.
Finally, our framework is quite flexible and much of the data needed to estimate the model are
readily available. These make it easily amenable to policy evaluations. We illustrate by estimating the
welfare, real wage, and frictional unemployment effects on our oecd-25 sample of countries of removing
trade barriers between eu countries and the us (as in the ttip preferential trade agreement) or among
twelve Asia Pacific countries (as in the tpp agreement), and of removing trade imbalances in the spirit
of Eaton, Kortum, and Neiman (2013).
The main empirical contribution of this paper is to estimate the sector-specific labor market frictions
in a structural manner for 35 tradable and non-tradable sectors. We find that our estimates correlate
well with the observed us manufacturing sectoral unemployment rates and that the global economic
crisis that started in 2008 ended up having a proportional impact on unemployment rates across
manufacturing sectors. Both results are consistent with our formulation of the labor market frictions
as the product of country-time and sector-specific effects.6
The normative contribution of the paper is to provide a rationale for the public’s interest in em-
ployment effects of trade. In our (Ricardian) model, all workers are ex-ante identical but some end
up in involuntary unemployment ex-post. In addition, employed workers end up working in different
sectors and earning different wages in equilibrium (though ex ante expected wages are equalised across
sectors). If society is averse to inequality (which can be the case even as workers are risk neutral),
5We account for the transition effects in our empirical framework using country-specific time dummies.
6 A complementary paper (Carre`re, Fugazza, Olarreaga, and Robert-Nicoud 2014) finds that countries that have a
comparative advantage in labor market friction-intensive sectors experience an increase in unemployment following trade
liberalization episodes. This evidence is consistent with the reallocation effect. In the current paper, we estimate these
sector-specific frictions but we do not test the consequences of the reallocation effect.
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then we show that maximising a social welfare function as in Atkinson (1970) is conceptually similar to
optimizing over a geometric combination of the average real wage and the unemployment rate.7 This
is an important result: our model features ex post unequal treatment of equals, something valued neg-
atively by a society averse to inequality. Also, in this setting, trade can lead to Stolper-Samuelson-like
distributional effects between employed and unemployed workers. Both of these effects may explain the
expansion of the welfare state in inequality-averse open economies as emphasized by Rodrik (1998) and
Epifani and Gancia (2009). Finally, our paper contributes to the recent debate on the gains from trade
sparked by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012).8 Our model emphasizes that average real
wages are only one (arguably major) component of welfare in the presence of labor market frictions and
societal aversion to inequality. In this way, our paper is also related to the literature on trade-induced
wage inequality.9
We contribute to the existing literature on four accounts. First, we complement papers that study
labor market outcomes of various trade regimes. Brecher (1974) and Davidson, Martin, and Matusz
(1988) set up Heckscher-Ohlin models in which the patterns of trade interact with domestic labor mar-
ket frictions (such as a minimum wage or search frictions) to determine the equilibrium unemployment
rate of trading countries. Davis (1998) emphasizes the terms of trade channel in a two-country frame-
work building on Brecher (1974). Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999), Costinot (2009), Helpman
and Itskhoki (2010), and Carre`re, Fugazza, Olarreaga, and Robert-Nicoud (2014) embed Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides labor market frictions into two-country Armington, Ricardian, factor-specific,
or intra-industry trade models. Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011) and Heid and Larch (2013)
embed labour market frictions into many-country heterogeneous firms and Armington trade models,
respectively. 10 Our contribution to this literature is to build on these by developing a multi-sector,
multi-country trade model. Several features of such a framework are noteworthy: (i) it generalizes
the central theoretical predictions of two-country and/or two-sector trade models to a more realistic
environment, which (ii) allows us to study the consequences of discriminatory trade liberalisation; (iii)
its key parameters can be structurally estimated using trade and unemployment data, based on which
(iv) we can use it to run counterfactual experiments.
Second, our paper recognizes that labor-market frictions can be a source of comparative advantage
like Cun˜at and Melitz (2012), Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1988), and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010).
7According to this criterion, the planner puts all weight on real wages in the limiting case of no inequality aversion
(Bentham) and on unemployment in the polar case of extreme inequality aversion (Rawls). Appendix B also reports
results for the alternative criterion put forth by Sen (1976).
8See in particular Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Head, Mayer, and Thoenig (2014), Melitz and Redding (2015),
Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015), and Ossa (forthcoming).
9 See e.g. Antra`s, de Gortari, and Itskhoki (2015), Burstein and Vogel (2015), Faber and Fally (2015), Helpman,
Itskhoki, and Redding (2012), Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding (2015), Krishna, Pool, and Senses (2012), and
Verhoogen (2008); Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) provide a review of the empirical literature on developing countries.
10Another important strand of this literature considers the impact of trade on unemployment caused by ‘efficient’ or
‘fair wages’, as in Davis and Harrigan (2011), Egger and Kreickemeier (2012), and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006).
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In our framework, trade patterns depend on sector-specific labor market frictions and sector-specific
total factor productivity in a perfectly symmetric fashion.
Third, our paper contributes to the lively policy and academic literatures on the economic effects
of ttip, tpp, and trade rebalancing.11 Most of these papers display the expansion effect but none
features our reallocation effect.
Finally, our application of a welfare criterion to a trade context is quite novel; we are aware of
only two freshly minted papers using such criteria. Antra`s, de Gortari, and Itskhoki (2015) and
Galle, Rodr´ıguez-Clare, and Yi (2015) apply the Atkinson (1970) social welfare function to study the
distributional consequences of trade reforms among heterogeneous agents. We use this criterion (as well
as Sen’s 1976) in a context in which labor-market search frictions generate involuntary unemployment
and thus ex post unequal treatment of homogeneous workers. To the extent that trade gains are not
redistributed through unemployment benefits, there are winners and losers in terms of employment or
earnings, or both. This affects welfare negatively in inequality-averse societies and this welfare loss
may erode part or all of the real wage gains from trade.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4 introduce technology, preferences,
and labor market frictions, respectively. Proposition 1 summarizes the properties of the autarky equi-
librium unemployment rate and average real wage. Section 5 allows for international trade and derives
sufficient conditions, summarized in Proposition 2, under which gains from trade are associated with
less unemployment. Proposition 3 establishes conditions for this result to extend to inequality-averse
open economies. Finally, Section 6 estimates the parameters of the model, Section 7 presents the results
of a series of counterfactual exercises, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Technology and production
Consider a world comprising I countries, labelled with subscripts i and j. There are K final good
sectors in the world economy that use a single factor of production, labor L, for production. Each
sector k produces a differentiated good consisting of potentially infinitely many (countable) different
varieties x ∈ Xik ⊆ N as in Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012). Technology exhibits constant
returns to scale and is variety- and country-specific. Specifically, let the output level be defined as
Qik(x) = ϕik(x)Hik(x), (1)
where Hik(x) is the number of production workers and ϕik(x) is productivity level of the representative
firm producing variety x in sector k in country i. This technology parameter has a deterministic
11 Papers that estimate economic effects of the ttip include the Bertelsmann (2013) report as well as Aichele, Felber-
mayr, and Heiland (2014), Egger, Francois, Manchin, and Nelson (2015), Felbermayr, Heid, Larch, and Yalcin (2014),
Fontagne´, Gourdon, and Jean (2013), Francois, Manchin, Norberg, Pindyuk, and Tomberger (2013), and Heid and Larch
(2013). Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2012) analyse the economic effects of tpp. Eaton, Kortum, and Neiman (2013) look
at the unemployment consequences of current account imbalances.
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component, ϕik, which is country- and sector- specific, and a stochastic component, which is the
outcome of a random process such that productivity differs across varieties. Specifically, we assume
that ϕik(x) is drawn independently for all (i, k, x) from a Fre´chet distribution with shape parameter θ
such that
Fik(ϕ) = exp
[
−
(
ϕ
ϕik
)−θ]
,
where the scale parameter ϕik > 0 governs absolute productivity levels and the shape parameter θ > 1
is negatively related to the scope for comparative advantage across varieties: the lower θ, the higher
the dispersion of the ϕik’s.
12
3 Demand and preferences
We assume that the representative consumer in country i is risk neutral, spends a constant share αik of
her income on the composite good produced by sector k, and holds ces preferences across the varieties
within each sector:
Ui =
K∏
k=1
Qαikik , where Qik =
[∑
x∈Xik
Qik(x)1−1/σ
] 1
1−1/σ
(2)
and
∑
k αik = 1 for all i. The various Q’s stand for quantities consumed, Xik is the set of sector k
varieties that are available for consumption in country i, and σ < 1 + θ is the common elasticity of
substitution between any pair of varieties.
It follows from (2) that expenditure in any country i on variety x of good k is given by
Eik(x) =
[
pik(x)
pik
]1−σ
αikEi, (3)
where Ei is the aggregate expenditure in country i, p denotes prices, and
pik ≡
[∑
x∈Xik
pik(x)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
(4)
is the price index for good k in country i (i.e. it is the dual of Qik). It follows from (2) that the unit
price of the bundle Ui is equal to the geometric weighted average of the sectoral prices:
Pi =
K∏
k=1
pαikik . (5)
12To see this, let θ > 2 (so that the first and second moments of F both exist) and note that E(ϕ2)/E(ϕ)2 is equal to
Γ(1− 2/θ)/Γ(1− 1/θ), which is decreasing in θ by Γ′(.) > 0, where Γ(·) is the gamma function.
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4 Labor market frictions, wage bargaining, and equilibrium
(un)employment
Each country i is endowed with an inelastic labor force L¯i. An infinitely elastic supply of potential
firms may enter the labor market by opening vacancies. There are search-and-matching frictions in the
labor market. This generates hiring costs and matching rents over which the firm and the employee
bargain, as we explain in detail below.
In our model labor market frictions are sector -specific. That is, each sector is a segmented labor
‘submarket’ (Barnichon and Figura, 2015). An alternative, equally plausible hypothesis, is that labor
market frictions are occupation-specific. In this case, at equilibrium, a sector-specific friction is a
weighted average of the frictions pertaining to the occupations employed by the sector, as we show in
Appendix A.13 For the sake of simplicity (and without loss of generality), we thus develop the more
parsimonious model (without explicit occupations) below.
4.1 Matching frictions
Firms open vacancies and workers search for jobs. Let Vik denote the endogenous number of open
vacancies and let Lik denote the endogenous mass of workers who seek employment in sector k, country
i. We denote the subset of those workers who are actually hired in sector k by Hik.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, so that the number of successful matches (and
thus of hired workers) in each sector equals
Hik = µ˜ikV
1−λ
ik L
λ
ik, (6)
where the total factor productivity (tfp) of the matching process, µ˜ik, varies across countries and
sectors and where λ ∈ (0, 1) is the labor share in the matching process. There is sectoral equilibrium
unemployment whenever Hik < Lik. We define the employment rate in sector k as
`ik ≡ Hik
Lik
. (7)
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) refer to `ik as the tightness of the labor market in sector k, country i. It
is also the equilibrium probability of finding a job in this sector conditional on searching in it.
Let the parameter νik denote the unit vacancy cost, which is paid in terms of the domestic con-
sumption bundle Ui. In our setting, this parameter includes sector-specific training costs and such
13In Appendix A, we build a model with an additional layer of occupations. Labor market frictions operate at this layer.
Each sector combines various occupations with its specific Cobb-Douglas technology. The properties of the equilibrium
at the sector level of this alternative model are identical to those of the more parsimonious model that we develop in the
main text. By the same token, we could add input-output linkages among sectors.
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costs vary greatly across sectors. For each worker actually hired, Vik/Hik vacancies need be open. Thus
the per worker hiring cost is equal to PiνikVik/Hik. Using (6) and (7), this cost is equal to
cik ≡ Pi
(
`λik
µik
) 1
1−λ
, (8)
where
µik ≡ µ˜ik
ν1−λik
(9)
is the sector-specific matching total-factor productivity (tfp) adjusted for vacancy costs, henceforth
matching efficiency for short; in other words, µ is the inverse of all labor market frictions. Thus, the
sector-specific cost of hiring a worker in (8) depends on the tightness of, and on the frictions in, the
labor submarket.
Upon forming a match, the firm and the worker bargain over the wage. We turn to this next.
4.2 Wage bargaining
Aggregate revenue of firms in the triple (i, k, x) is defined as Eik(x) ≡ pik(x)Qik(x). Using (1), we
rewrite the expression for revenue as Eik(x) = pik(x)ϕik(x)Hik(x), which implies that revenue is linear
in labor. Let
rik(x) ≡ Eik(x)
Hik(x)
= pik(x)ϕik(x) (10)
define the revenue per worker of the representative firm. Once matched, the firm and the worker
bargain over the firm-specific wage, wki (x), in order to split the joint revenue rik(x) in a cooperative
fashion. They take all other prices as given. Disagreeing and breaking the match has an opportunity
cost because it implies searching for another partner, which is costly because of matching frictions.
Thus, upon matching, rik(x) is a rent over which the worker and the firm bargain. For simplicity,
we assume equal bargaining weights so that the firm and the worker each get rik(x)/2 (Helpman and
Itskhoki, 2010). Note that the size of a firm is irrelevant by virtue of constant returns to labor: the
firm bargains with each worker independently and the outcome of its bargaining with one worker has
no impact on its bargaining situation with any other worker. It then follows that the wage in the triple
(i, k, x) is equal to
wik(x) =
1
2
Eik(x)
Hik(x)
.
From the point of view of the firm, replacing a worker entails the sector- and country-specific search
cost cik defined in (8), which is exogenous to the individual firm x. Any firm finds it optimal to open
vacancies until the equilibrium individual wage, wik(x), is equal to the cost of replacing a worker, cik.
This implies
wik(x) = wik = cik (11)
9
and
pik(x) = cik(x) = 2
cik
ϕik(x)
,
where cik(x) is the unit cost of production of firm x and pik(x) = cik(x) holds by perfect competition.
Two properties of (11) and of the pricing expression above are noteworthy. Wages are common across all
varieties within a sector but production costs may vary. The latter result holds because heterogeneous
costs reflect heterogeneous productivity levels across varieties within each sector. The intuition for the
former result is as follows: firms increase employment until the bargaining wage outcome is equal to
the cost of replacing a worker. Since cik is common among all firms in sector k, they all pay the same
wage wik regardless of the productivity ϕik(x) with which they actually produce.
4.3 Equilibrium unemployment and utility
All workers actively look for employment, such that the full-participation condition reads as
L¯i =
K∑
k=1
Lik.
Henceforth we assume that workers can freely choose the sector in which they search for a job and
that this choice is irreversible.14 Remember that individuals are assumed to be risk neutral by (2).
Together these imply that the expected wage, defined as the sector-specific product of the wage wik
and of the probability of being employed `ik, must be the same across sectors in equilibrium; we denote
this common expected wage by wi.
15 Thus, for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}, the no-arbitrage condition
wi = `ikwik (12)
holds. Combining this expression with (8) and (11), the expected wage in country i is equal to wi =
Pi(`ik/µik)1/(1−λ), for any k. Dividing both sides of this expression by Pi yields
∀k :
(
`ik
µik
) 1
1−λ
=
wi
Pi
≡ ωi, (13)
where ωi denotes the average real wage or indirect utility of workers; since firms make zero profit,
this is also the real per capita income. In equilibrium, sectoral employment rates reflect sectoral labor
matching efficiency, i.e. `ik ∝ µik, where the factor of proportionality, ω1−λi , is the same for all sectors.
Note also a higher level of per capita real income ωi is associated with higher levels of employment in
14Another way to formalize this is the following. All workers have one unit of learning time and one unit of working
time. They use the former to acquire the skills specific to the sector of their choosing. This choice is sunk.
15It is straightforward to work out an extension of the model in which the representative consumer had constant
relative risk aversion preferences, in which the level of utility would be U1−ai /(1 − a), where a ∈ (0, 1) is the constant
rate of relative risk aversion. The ex-ante free-mobility across sector would thus imply `ikw
1−a
ik = w
1−a
i , some wi > 0.
None of our qualitative results would be affected by this and we therefore impose a = 0 in what follows for simplicity.
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all sectors, ceteris paribus. This result is in line with common wisdom among policymakers: if a reform
is good for employment then it must be real-wage augmenting. This intuition is incomplete in general
(see Section 5) but exact in autarky. We turn to this special case next.
Autarky. Here we show that the unemployment rate ui and average real wage ωi are negatively
related in the autarky equilibrium. We proceed in steps. First, the fraction of workers looking for
a job in sector k is equal to the fraction of income spent on good k, i.e. Lik/L¯i = αik all k and
all i, by virtue of Cobb-Douglas preferences, constant returns to scale, and perfect competition in all
sectors.16 Second, let |Xik| = N , all i and k, some N ∈ N, so that the exact price index pik in (4) obeys
γ−1pik
p→ wik/ϕik, where γ > 0 is defined below.17 Using the no-arbitrage condition (12) to substitute
for wik in this expression yields
pik = γ
wi
ϕik`ik
, where γ ≡ 2
[
Γ
(
1− σ − 1
θ
)
N
] 1
1−σ
and Γ(·) is the gamma function. Third, plugging this expression into the exact price index in (5) yields
Pi = γwi
∏
k(ϕik`ik)
−αik . Using (13) to substitute for `ik and rearranging yields
ω0i =
[
1
γ
K∏
k=1
(ϕikµik)
αik
] 1
λ
, (14)
where the superscript ‘0’ pertains to autarky equilibrium values. That is to say, the average real wage
of a country in autarky is proportional to its aggregate tfp, where the appropriate measure of tfp
in our framework includes both the efficiency of the labor matching functions and the tfp of the
production functions. Another modification of the usual neoclassical framework is the power 1/λ at
which productivity is being raised. This is because labor accounts for only a fraction of the matching
function.
We finally turn to the equilibrium unemployment rate in autarky. Let ui and `i denote the coun-
trywide unemployment and employment rates, respectively, with ui + `i ≡ 1. We define country i’s
16From (2), expenditure on good k is equal to Eik = αikEi. Aggregate national income and consumption, Ei, is a sum
of all wages and hiring costs, and is given by
Ei =
K∑
k=1
wikHik +
K∑
k=1
cikHik = 2wiL¯i.
The value of production in sector k is equal to (cik +wik)Hik = 2wikHik. Using (7) and the no-arbitrage condition (12)
yields wikHik = wiLik. Together, these equilibrium relationships imply the result in the text.
17Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) assume Xik = N so that N = +∞. Here, we assume instead that N is finite
(so that pik, Pi, and ω0i are well defined) and large enough for the quality of the approximation to be reasonably good.
This assumption is needed neither in Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (because they care only about comparative
advantage and thus relative prices) nor in the rest of our paper (because we compare different equilibriums); the N ’s
cancel out in both cases.
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unemployment rate as the fraction of the working population that has not found a job in equilibrium:
ui ≡ 1− 1
L¯i
K∑
k=1
Hik = 1−
K∑
k=1
Lik
L¯i
`ik, (15)
where the second equality follows from (7), meaning that ui is a weighted average of all sectoral
unemployment rates. Using the autarky equilibrium condition Lik/L¯i = αik and (13) to substitute for
Lik/L¯i and `ik in (15) yields
u0i = 1−
(
ω0i
)1−λ
µ¯0i , where µ¯
0 ≡
K∑
k=1
αikµik (16)
is the autarky equilibrium average level of matching efficiency. The equilibrium unemployment rate is
decreasing in both the average matching efficiency and in the real wage. We can then use (14) and (16)
to establish the following result:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium real wage and aggregate unemployment in autarky). At the
autarky equilibrium: (i) nationwide average real wage is increasing in the production tfp and labor
matching efficiency of any sector; (ii) the nationwide unemployment rate is decreasing in the production
tfp and labor matching efficiency of any sector.
Proof. (i) ω0i is increasing in ϕik and µik, all k, by inspection of (14). (ii) The tfp terms influence
u0i both directly and indirectly. The direct effect of µik on u
0
i is negative by inspection of (16). The
indirect effects of ϕik and µik on u
0
i work via ω
0
i and they are negative by inspection of (16) and by
step (i). .
5 Trade equilibrium
Proposition 1 implies that the real wage and unemployment are perfectly and negatively correlated,
given the preference and matching technology vectors αi and µi. Many a policymaker would find
this tautological. However, this logic is incomplete when countries trade. The reason for this is as
fundamental as it is simple: our measure of utility is real consumption. Unemployment is foregone
production. Insofar as consumption is equal to production in autarky, it makes sense that one is the
flip side of the other, as established in Proposition 1. Things fundamentally change with trade because
the whole point of international trade is to disentangle what a country consumes from what it produces.
Trade thus relaxes the tight relationship between our measure of real wage and the unemployment rate.
5.1 Trade frictions and trade flows
There are I countries in the world. All markets are perfectly competitive and there are heterogeneous
costs to trade. These costs take the standard iceberg form (Samuelson 1952), such that only a fraction
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1/τijk of the goods shipped from country i to country j reach their destination. We impose (i) τijk > τiik
for all (i, j, k) with i 6= j, and (ii) τilk ≤ τijkτjlk. Here, (i) states that trade across international borders
is costlier than trade within countries; and (ii) is a technical condition that rules out cross-country
arbitrage.
Under these assumptions, the all-inclusive cost of delivering variety x in industry k produced in
country i and consumed in country j is equal to
cijk(x) = 2τijk
cik
ϕik(x)
.
Countries consume goods from the lowest cost source by virtue of perfect competition. As a result, the
equilibrium price of a variety x of good k in country j is such that
pjk(x) = min
i
cijk(x). (17)
Let ci ≡ wλi P1−λi denote the ‘input cost’ in country i.18 Let also
tijk ≡ τijk
ϕikµik
ci (18)
define the delivery cost of all varieties of sector k that are actually shipped from i to j, and
Tjk ≡
(∑
i′=1
t−θi′jk
)− 1
θ
(19)
be a destination-sector specific term often referred to as the remoteness of country j in sector k (Head
and Mayer, 2013). Denote finally the value of total exports from country i to country j in sector k by
Eijk ≡
∑
x∈Xijk Eijk(x), where Xijk ≡ {x ∈ X | cijk(x) = mini′ ci′jk(x)} is the set of varieties exported
by country i to country j in industry k. It then follows from (11), (12), and (17) that bilateral trade
flows (in value) at the industry level obey the following gravity equation:
Eijk =
(
tijk
Tjk
)−θ
αjkEj. (20)
The first term in the right-hand side above is country i’s market share in country j’s market k.
Inspection of (18) and (20) reveals that country i’s volume of exports of good k to country j is
increasing in the destination market size, αjkEj. Also, country i’s market share is decreasing in its
delivery cost to destination j relative to the delivery of all alternative partners. This delivery cost is
increasing in trade and transportation costs τijk and in the input cost ci, and it is decreasing in the
production tfp’s and labor matching efficiencies, ϕik and µik, respectively. The novelty with respect to
the Ricardian models of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) is
twofold. First, the overall tfp of a sector is the product of production tfp ϕk and labour matching tfp
18Combining (11), (12), and (13), we obtain cik = ci/µik.
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net of training costs µk; see (18). Consequently, they cannot be identified separately using trade flow
data as per (20). Second, wages do not enter (18) linearly by λ < 1 because the matching technology
exhibits decreasing returns to labor. This gives rise to the expansion effect as any increase in sales
translates into a less-that-proportional increase in wages, the remainder of the effect being partially
absorbed by the tightening of labour markets.
In the above, tijk contains ci, which is endogenous. The model being block recursive, we can
establish that equilibrium vector of ci’s exists and is unique following the method of proof in Alvarez
and Lucas (2007).
5.2 Trade, (un)employment, and utility
Here we encapsulate the model of frictional unemployment of Section 4 into our trade model. It is
easier to work with the employment rate `i than with the unemployment rate ui (recall that `i+ui = 1
by definition), so we solve for the trade equilibrium employment rate.
Let us define the production share of sector k in country i as
sik ≡ Lik
Li
=
Eik
Ei
,
where the second equality follows from Eik = 2wikHik = 2wiLik. Note that the Lik’s are not observable
but that we can infer the Eik’s using domestic production data. Using these, we may rewrite (15) as
`i ≡ 1− ui = ω1−λi µ¯i, where µ¯i ≡
K∑
k=1
sikµik (21)
is the weighted average matching efficiency in country i evaluated at the trade equilibrium.
In the remainder of this section we consider two comparative statics exercises. They set the stage
for the counterfactual exercises of Section 7 by emphasizing the mechanisms at work in the model. We
start with the consequences of marginal changes.
Marginal changes. We use hats to denote relative changes. Consider a marginal trade reform that
influences (real) wages and employment rates. Total differentiation of (21) yields
ˆ`
i = (1− λ)ωˆi + 1
µ¯i
Cov (sˆik, µik) , (22)
where
Cov (sˆik, µik) ≡
K∑
k=1
sˆik (µik − µ¯i)
is the covariance between the sector-specific matching efficiencies and the shift in production shares.19
Under non-discriminatory trade liberalisation and in the absence of trade diversion, the shift in pro-
duction shares could be interpreted as a shift in revealed comparative advantage.
19Note that the average variation in production shares is zero.
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Inspection of (22) reveals that two effects compete in the determination of the overall impact of
a trade reform on the equilibrium employment rate in the open economy. First, as in the autarky
equilibrium, an increase in the real wage has a positive partial effect on the employment rate. This
expansion effect affects all sectors in the same way by (13): when a trade reform results in efficiency
gains from trade, then such gains are associated with increased job creation and, in turn, higher
real wages and lower equilibrium unemployment rates. Second, for given real wages, any reform that
reallocates resources towards sectors with low labor market frictions relative to the domestic average
(i.e. sectors such that µik > µ¯i) results in a rise of employment `i – and vice-versa. This reallocation
effect occurs because labor market frictions differ across labor submarkets. This outcome, which was
absent in the autarky equilibrium, arises because trade allows for the uncoupling of consumption and
production bundles.
This finding has important implications for trade policy and its accompanying measures. Though
improved trade may result in the overall growth of national purchasing power, there are differential
effects on the individuals themselves. To the extent that gains from trade are not redistributed through
unemployment benefits, there are winners and losers in terms of employment.20
Discrete changes. We now use (21) to compare two equilibriums – say, the actual equilibrium and
a counterfactual one (e.g. a free trade agreement, balanced trade). Variables pertaining to the current
equilibrium are un-superscripted; we use the superscript ‘cf’ for the counterfactual equilibrium.
The counterfactual domestic employment rate relative to its current level is equal to
`CFi
`i
=
(
ωCFi
ωi
)1−λ [
1− Cov
(
sik − sCFik , µik
)
µ¯i
]
, (23)
where
Cov
(
sik − sCFik , µik
) ≡ K∑
k=1
(
sik − sCFik
)
(µik − µ¯i) .
If the counterfactual is autarky then s0ik = αik and Cov(·) ≡
∑
k (sik − αik) (µik − µ¯i) is the covariance
between the sectoral matching efficiencies and a theory-consistent measure of revealed comparative
advantage of country i. To see this, note that sik is greater than αik in exporting sectors whereas
sik < αik holds in import-competing sectors. Of course, actual patterns of trade reflect not only
technology-based source of comparative advantage but also heterogeneous bilateral trade barriers due
to physical geography (e.g. distance) and discriminatory trade policies. But it is safe to assert that
observed trade patterns reflect at least in part the comparative advantages of countries when the
benchmark is autarky.
With this note of caution in mind, we can thus establish the following:
20Note also that our real wage is measured in terms of expected real wage. Would the employment rate decrease, then
individuals that retain their job would experience an even higher real wage growth than the national average. More on
this in subsection 5.3 below.
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Proposition 2 (Gains from trade and unemployment). (i) The trade equilibrium employment
rate in country i (`i) is greater than its autarky employment rate (`
0
i ) if it has a revealed comparative
advantage in sectors with relatively high matching efficiency:
Cov (sik − αik, µik) > 0 ⇒ `i > `0i .
(ii) The actual equilibrium employment rate in country i (`i) is greater than the counterfactual em-
ployment rate (`CFi ) if the actual allocation yields higher real wages and if it allocates more resources
to sectors with high matching efficiencies than the counterfactual allocation does:
ωi
ωCFi
> 1 and Cov
(
sik − sCFik , µik
)
> 0 ⇒ `i > `CFi .
Proof. The proof of (ii) is by inspection of (23); (i) is a corollary of (ii) and follows from the fact that
ωi/ω
0
i > 1 by Samuelson (1962) and Kemp’s (1962) Gains From Trade theorems.
Of course, this Proposition leaves open a situation in which the counterfactual allocation is asso-
ciated with both a higher level of average real wages and a higher unemployment rate. A necessary
condition for this to occur is that resources be reallocated towards sectors with low matching efficiencies.
Finally, note that if comparative advantage is determined purely by the country-sector specific
production technologies (the ϕik’s), which is the case if e.g. µik = µiµk, all i and k, then the sik do
not depend on labor market frictions by (18), (19), and (20). In this case, all else equal, countries that
enjoy a purely technological comparative advantage in high-µk sectors end up with a relatively high
employment rate at equilibrium.
5.3 Welfare and ‘Stolper-Samuelson effects’
In our model, workers are homogeneous ex ante but are heterogeneous ex post: some are unemployed
and earn a wage while the rest are unemployed. Assessing effects of trade reforms on the average
real wage only thus provides an incomplete picture of the full welfare effects. Conversely, many a
policymaker emphasize the (un)employment effects of trade reforms with scant consideration for the
real wage effects. We bridge the gap between these polar views by using the following welfare criterion:
W =
ω
uξ
,
where ξ ∈ R+ is a parameter governing society’s aversion to inequality. In the limit ξ → 0, society
is neutral towards inequality and cares only about the average real wage. This corresponds to the
Benthamite social welfare function. Conversely, in the limit ξ →∞, society is so inequality-averse that
it aims at minimizing the number of low income earners (here, the unemployed). This corresponds
to the Rawlsian social welfare function. In our quantitative analysis, we assess the welfare effects of
counterfactual policy reforms by putting an equal weight to average real wages and unemployment
rates, namely we set ξ = 1, so that
WCF
W
− 1 = ω
CF/uCF
ω/u
− 1 = ω
CF
ω
− u
CF
u
, (24)
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where the second equality is a first-order approximation. In Appendix B, we show that changes in
welfare as measured by this criterion are identical to changes in Atkinson’s (1970) social welfare function
with a societal constant rate of inequality aversion equal to two.21 There, we also show that Sen’s
(1976) alternative welfare criterion puts much less weight on unemployment changes than Atkinson’s.
To summarize, we have shown:
Proposition 3 (Welfare, aggregate unemployment, and the gains from trade). Let us assess
welfare changes using the W-criterion. Then (i) if society is neutral to inequality (ξ = 0) then max-
imising social welfare requires maximizing the average real wage and a trade reform is desirable if and
only if it raises the average real wage; (ii) if society is averse to inequality (ξ > 0) then a trade reform
is desirable if it simultaneously raises average real wages and reduces unemployment; it is undesirable
if it reduces ω and increases u.
Proof. (i) Immediate by limξ→0W = ω. (ii) Immediate from the definition of W ≡ ω/uξ. .
Discussion. A trade reform that raises real wages may be undesirable in a society that is averse to
income inequality if this reform is associated with a sufficiently large increase of the unemployment
rate. This intuitive finding has important implications for trade policy and its accompanying measures.
Though more open trade may result in the overall growth of national purchasing power, there are
differential effects on the individuals themselves. To the extent that trade gains are not redistributed
through unemployment benefits, there are winners as losers in terms of employment, earnings, or both.
Our model may also feature a magnifying effect similar to a Stolper-Samuelson effect: consider a
trade reform that leads to an increase in both u and ω; it follows that at least some of the workers
who are employed both before and after the trade reform see their real wage increase by more than
the average. Conversely, if the trade reform leads to a fall in both u and ω then at least some workers
see their real wage fall by more than the average. To see this, note that sectoral employment rates all
move in the same proportion by (13). In turn, sectoral wages move in the same proportion by (12).
Thus, if both the unemployment rate u and the average per capita income ω rise then it must be that
the per capita income of employed workers, ω/(1− u), rises proportionally more than ω. Thus, fewer
people are employed and those that remain employed enjoy a rise in their real income that is larger
than the average per capita income gain and those that loose their job endure a real loss, as was to be
shown. Such ‘Stolper-Samuelson’ effects are frown upon in inequality-averse societies.
6 Estimation methodology
In this section we take our model to the data. We proceed first by estimating the labor market frictions
and use these estimates to quantify the welfare and employment consequences of implementing three
21Empirically, Stern (1977) (for the uk) and Young (1990) (for the us) find degrees of inequality aversion in the range
[1.61− 1.97].
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counterfactual scenarios in Section 7.
6.1 Data
Bilateral sector-level trade data are obtained for 181 exporting countries and 139 importing countries
in 2008 from cepii’s baci database. Bilateral sector-level tariffs are taken from the trains (unctad)
database. Country-pair and internal distances as well as other gravity-type variables are from cepii’s
gravity database. The regional trade agreement rta dummy is computed using the bilateral database
available from Jeffrey Bergstrand’s website (May 2013 version). Sectoral production data is taken
from oecd’s Stan database (isicrev3) and is available for 25 oecd countries over the period 2001-
2008, henceforth ‘oecd-25’. We classify data to 35 isicrev3 sectors (out of which 24 produce tradable
goods). Table 1 lists the sectors. Both the sector-specific and the aggregate country-level unemployment
rates are obtained using data from the ilo Key Indicators of the Labor Market (kilm) database. In
computing the sector-specific unemployment rate, we use the number of unemployed persons whose
previous employment was in that sector (more on this below). The trade balance for year 2008 is
sourced from World Bank Development Indicators (wdi) database.
6.2 Estimation and empirical strategy
We aim to quantify the employment consequences of any given counterfactual. For convenience, we
rewrite (23) as
`CFi
`i
=
(
ωCFi
ωi
)1−λ∑K
k=1 s
CF
ik µik∑K
k=1 sikµik
,
where, as before, the un-superscripted and superscripted variables pertain to the current and counter-
factual allocations, respectively.
Data on the actual sectoral production shares sik and on real per capita gdp are readily available for
the oecd-25 countries. However, there does not exist any comprehensive and detailed data on country-
and sector-specific labor market frictions so that the µik’s need to be estimated. We also estimate the
counterfactual values for the sectoral production shares sCFik and real per capita gdp ω
CF
i . For this
purpose (i) we use the largest available sample of countries to estimate trade costs and elasticities
and to simulate worldwide counterfactual trade flows and (ii) we compute the counterfactual sectoral
production shares and real per capita gdp for the oecd-25 countries with available sectoral production
and unemployment data. In the rest of Section 6 we estimate in turn:
• The matching efficiencies, µik (subsection 6.3);
• The elasticity of trade to delivery costs, θ (subsection 6.4).
We start with the estimation of the µik’s.
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6.3 Estimation of sector-specific matching efficiencies
Our identifying assumption is that the country and sector components of µik are multiplicatively
separable. Our data feature a panel dimension; adding time subscripts to our variables, we thus
impose µikt = µitµk, for all i, k, and t, that is, matching efficiencies are country-time- and sector-
specific. Countries with labor market institutions that are more favorable to job creation tend to have
higher µi’s on average than countries with more rigid rules; the µit-specification allows for country-
specific business cycles. Also, job creation and the matching of workers and firms is easier in sectors
with a high µk than in sectors with a low µk across countries and time.
Our data does not allow us to identify country-sector components of µik (though we do identify
country and sector components separately). However, several papers in the literature surveyed by Nunn
and Trefler (2014), including Cun˜at and Melitz (2012) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), emphasize that
sector-specific labor market frictions interact with country-specific institutional characteristics to give
rise to a source of comparative advantage, a possibility that is ruled out by our identifying assumption.
Reassuringly, the first-order effect of the reallocation channel that is central to the mechanism of our
model does not rely on the interaction between the country and sector dimensions of µik. Indeed,
Chor (2010) finds that comparative advantage explains only a small fraction of the residual variation
of bilateral trade flows; much is explained by the country and sector fixed effects (µk and µi in our
notation).22 Furthermore, labor market institutions are quantitatively the smallest among several
sources of comparative advantage that Chor (2010) is simultaneously testing (other sources include
financial market institutions, product market institutions, and relative factor endowments). All these
lend support to the idea that our specification captures the first-order effects of our reallocation channel.
We can now estimate the µk’s in a structural way as follows. Taking logs of (13) and allowing for
time variation yields
ln `ikt = ln
(
µitω
1−λ
it
)
+ lnµk,
which can be estimated by imposing a country-year fixed effect FEit = ln
(
µitω
1−λ
it
)
and a sector-
specific fixed effect FEk = lnµk. That is, we run the regression ln `ikt = FEit + FEk + errorikt. In
computing the left-hand side variable, we use sectoral unemployment data for 25 oecd countries for the
period 2001-2008, sourced from the kilm database, where the sectoral unemployment rate is defined
as 1− `ikt.23 Sectoral unemployment data is available for 15 aggregate sectors (see list in Table 1), of
which one is the manufacturing sector.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the 90% confidence intervals of each sector-specific
22Note, though, that we do allow for any source of comparative advantage to play a role in the determination of trade
flows when estimating the trade elasticities and other gravity coefficients in subsection 6.4 below.
23 There, sector-k unemployment rate is defined as uikt = Uikt/(Uikt + Hikt), where Hikt is the number of workers
currently employed in sector k and Uikt is the number of workers who are currently unemployed and whose last job was
in sector k. This definition of sectoral unemployment is the exact empirical counterpart of uikt in our static model, where
uikt is the fraction of workers who are searching for a job in sector k but are unable to form a match, i.e. uikt = 1− `ikt.
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matching efficiency estimated on a sample of 1,624 observations for the 15 aggregate sectors. The
highest matching efficiency appears to be in ‘Financial intermediation’ and ‘Electricity, gas and wa-
ter supply’ while the lowest estimated µk’s are found in sectors such as ‘Construction’, ‘Hotels and
restaurants’ or ‘Agriculture, hunting and forestry.’
As we are particularly interested in estimating relative matching efficiencies of different manufac-
turing sectors, we estimate these using the definition of µ¯ in (21). The model predicts that the average
matching efficiency of a given sector (in this case the aggregate manufacturing sector) is given by
(omitting country and time subscripts for simplicity)
µ¯manuf =
21∑
m=1
smµm,
where µm and sm are, respectively, the matching efficiency and the production share of each of the
21 manufacturing sectors contained within the aggregated manufacturing sector (see Figure 1), and∑
m sm = 1. The matching efficiencies of all 35 sectors are then non-linearly estimated in one step
on the same sample of 1,624 observations and so we replace FEk by
∑
m smµm for k = manuf in the
regression ln `ikt = FEit + FEk + errorikt.
Table 2, column 3, reports our estimates of sector-specific matching efficiencies for 35 sectors. Most
values are significant at the 1% significance level. The estimated µk’s range from 0.033 for ‘Wood and
products of wood and cork’ to 1.49 for ‘Non-metallic mineral products’ and ‘Printing and publishing.’
Furthermore, these sector-specific matching efficiencies have a high predictive power, as 45% of the R2
is explained by the sector-specific fixed effect, while the other 55% is explained by the country-time
fixed effect.
As an external validity test of this empirical strategy, we correlate the estimated values of the effi-
ciencies of the 21 manufacturing sectors computed from the oecd-25 countries with available observable
sector-specific employment rates that are provided for the us by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our
model and our identifying assumption lead us to predict a positive and stable relationship. The bls
database includes a decomposition of employment rates for 12 manufacturing sectors for several years.
We thus aggregate some of our 21 µm’s in order to correspond to the 12 bls manufactured sectors as
a weighted average of the sub-sectors, where the weights are given by the us production shares in the
relevant years. The correlation and rank correlation between our estimates of µm and the employment
rates `US,m are reported in Table 3. The correlations remain stable throughout the financial crisis as
reflected in the quasi-parallel translation of the 2007, 2008 and 2009 linear fits reported in Figure 2.
That is, we find that labor matching efficiency is pro-cyclical, as in Barnichon and Figura (2015)’s
estimates of an aggregate matching function.
These patterns in Table 3 and Figure 2 are reassuring on three counts. First, the correlations are
strong (over 0.6 on average). Second, since all correlations are between a us variable and an oecd
average variable, this suggests that there is no discernible sector-country component in the matching
efficiencies. Third, the stability of the relationship over time seems to rule out sector-time variations,
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which vindicates our identifying assumption. Note that 2009 is an out-of-sample and atypical year; yet,
the correlation between the µm’s and the `US,m’s is the same as in the previous years in a statistical
sense.
6.4 Estimation of trade elasticities
We use a gravity equation to estimate the trade elasticity with respect to bilateral trade costs. Using
expressions (18), (20), and (19), and taking logs yields
lnEijk = −θ ln τijk − θ lnκik − ln
I∑
i′=1
(τi′jkκi′k)
−θ + ln(αjkEj), (25)
where Eijk is the value of exports from country i to country j in sector k and
κik ≡ w
λ
i P1−λi
ϕikµik
(26)
captures exporter-sector unobservables.
Let τijk ≡ (1+tariffijk)DδDij e(δrtaRTAij+δcontCONTij+δlangLANGij+δcolonCOLONij+δcurrCURRij), where tariffijk
is the ad valorem tariff rate that country j imposes on good k imports from i; Dij is the (geodesic) bi-
lateral distance between the economic capital cities of i and j; and the remaining variables are dummy
variables such that RTAij = 1 if a regional trade agreement is in force between i and j, CONTij = 1
if countries share a common border, LANGij = 1 if a common language is spoken by at least 9% of
the population of each country, COLONij = 1 if the country pair was ever in a colonial relationship,
and CURRij = 1 if these countries share a common currency.
We can then rewrite expression (25) as a gravity equation:
lnEijk = βtariff ln(1 + tariffijk) + βD ln(Dij) + βrtaRTAij + βcontCONTij + βlangLANGij
+ βcolonCOLONij + βcurrCURRij + FEik + FEjk + ijk, (27)
where the regression coefficients relate to the structural parameters of the model as βtariff = −θ,
βx = −θδx for x ∈ {D, rta, cont, lang, colon, curr}, FEik = −θ lnκik and FEjk = − ln
∑
i′(τi′jkκi′k)
−θ+
ln(αjkEj) are sector-exporter and sector-importer fixed effects, respectively, and ijk is measurement
error in Eijk.
We estimate the coefficients of this gravity equation using our cross-section sample of 181 exporters,
139 importers, and 24 tradable ISIC Rev3 sectors producing tradable goods for pre-crisis year 2008.
We obtain θˆ = −βˆtariff = 3.17 (See Appendix C on Gravity estimation for further estimates). These
findings are in line with the meta-analysis of Head and Mayer (2014) and the estimates of Simonovska
and Waugh (2014).24
24The median and the mean coefficients of 744 statistically significant estimates (obtained from 32 papers) of the
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7 Unemployment and welfare effects under various scenarios
In this section we compute a series of counterfactual exercises. Subsections 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 report the
counterfactual real wage, welfare, and unemployment effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (ttip), of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp), and of balancing trade in all countries,
respectively. Appendix D describes the methodology in details.
Counterfactual changes in real wages, unemployment rates, and welfare for both fta scenarios
(ttip and tpp) are carried out under the assumption that tariffs (as well as other, non-tariff barriers)
are eliminated among all fta members in both agricultural products and manufactures. In the trade
balance scenario (henceforth tb) we set the trade balance of each country in our database to zero.
Under all scenarios, we compute the counterfactual wages, prices, and vectors of shares of workers
allocated to each sector in all countries taking account of general equilibrium effects. This implies in
particular that we allow the vector of exporter-sector unobservables obtained in the gravity regression,
κˆik, to change endogenously within each policy experiment. We perform our calculations by iteration
using Matlab. Appendix D provides details.
Throughout all scenarios, we set the matching elasticity at λ = 0.6; this value is the midpoint of
Petrongolo and Pissarides’ (2001) “plausible range” of [0.5−0.7]. We run sensitivity tests in Appendix
E and our qualitative results are quite robust to this parametrization.
7.1 The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip) scenario
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip) is currently being negotiated between
the European Union and the United States and aims at removing trade barriers between the eu and
the us (including tariffs, unnecessary regulations, and restrictions on investment). An independent
impact report commissioned by the European Commission (Francois, Manchin, Norberg, Pindyuk, and
Tomberger, 2013) suggests that trade liberalisation will necessarily lead to job creation due to the
productivity gains and the increases in economic activity. However, our model suggests that trade
agreements could also lead to higher unemployment if workers are reallocated towards sectors with
higher-than-average labor market frictions.
In this counterfactual exercise, we set all bilateral eu-us tariffs to zero and we switch on the Regional
Trade Agreement dummy (as estimated from our gravity regression reported in Appendix C) among
all ttip countries.
We report the results for 28 oecd countries in Table 4 and Figure 3.25 All values are in %. The top
price elasticity in gravity regardless of the method are equal to −3.19 and −4.51, respectively (Head and Mayer, 2014).
Simonovska and Waugh (2014) use a simulated method of moments to estimate θˆ from disaggregate price and trade-flow
data and find roughly −4. Our estimate of −3.17 is slightly lower due to the introduction of the RTA dummy which
allows to control to some extent for non-tariff barriers to trade. When the RTA dummy is excluded, we obtain an
estimate of −4.34 (see Appendix C for detailed estimation statistics).
25We report results for our oecd-25 sample of countries as well as for New Zealand, Israel, and Ireland despite limited
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panel of Table 4 reports results for potential members of the ttip (us and eu countries); the bottom
panel reports results for a subset of oecd countries left out of the agreement. The first column displays
the unemployment rate of the base year (2008); all other columns report predicted changes under the
ttip relative to the actual values in the base year. The second column reports the ‘reallocation effect’
which arises as a result of the reallocation of workers across sectors characterized by heterogeneous
matching frictions. Changes in the unemployment rates are reported in the third column. The fourth
column displays the estimated changes in real wages, namely, the ‘expansion effect’ (
ωFTAi
ω2008i
). Finally,
column five reports changes in welfare as measured by (24): it is approximately equal to the difference
between columns 4 and 3. Figure 3 summarises our main results in terms of percentage changes in
unemployment levels and real wages for both ttip members (dark diamonds) and non-members (light
triangles). Figure 3 also features an ‘iso-welfare’ line, defined as the combination of changes in real
wages and unemployment levels that lead to a welfare change in (24) equal to zero. The mathematical
expression of the iso-welfare line is given by ω
FTA
ω2008
= u
FTA
u2008
. Countries experiencing a combination of
changes in unemployment and real wages above the iso-welfare line are better off under ttip; countries
with a combination of changes below the iso-welfare line are worse off.
Several results featured in Table 4 and Figure 3 are noteworthy. First, the magnitude of the
predicted changes is small. One reason for this is that eu-us tariffs are already low to start with;
another reason has to do with our using of trade data at a fine level of disaggregation and this tends to
produce smaller quantitative effects than when using more aggregated data (Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-
Clare 2014).26 We also include non-traded sectors, which tends to reduce estimates further.
Second, all countries signing the agreement benefit from higher real wages. By contrast, the effect
on country-wide employment is highly heterogeneous, both in direction and magnitude. This appears
clearly in Figure 3. Specifically, unemployment in the us is predicted to rise by 1.1% from a base
rate of 5.9% in year 2008 but is predicted to drop in most eu countries. These results underline
the key prediction of our theoretical framework: that gains from trade in terms of real wages and
employment effects are not perfectly correlated. While trade liberalisation may engender growth of
real wages due to increased production and reduced import prices, it may also lead to a restructuring
of production and thereby a reallocation of workers across sectors. Insofar as sectors are heterogeneous
in their ability to match workers to jobs, the overall unemployment rate may fall or rise. According to
our simulations, countries specialising in relatively high-friction sectors experience an increase in their
equilibrium unemployment rate under ttip, as is seemingly the case for countries such as Belgium,
data on sectoral production shares. We do not have access to employment data at a sufficiently disaggregated industry
level for the remaining 6 oecd countries or for the non-oecd countries, which prevents us from computing the reallocation
effect and the overall unemployment effects for such countries.
26For instance, our real wage effects are lower than those reported in Felbermayr, Heid, Larch, and Yalcin (2014) who
use a one-sector framework. In the same vein, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) simulate the real wage effect of the
imposition of a unilateral US tariff of 40% across the board assuming that all tariffs are zero in the initial equilibrium.
They find an average world real wage effect of −0.2% in the one sector framework and −0.14% when allowing for multiple
sectors.
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Italy, the Netherlands, and the US. All these countries benefit from trade in terms of an increase in
the real wage, but welfare as measured by our Atkinson welfare criterion in (24) is predicted to fall due
to an offsetting increase in unemployment. In the German case, the unemployment and the real wage
effects almost exactly cancel out.
Third, the real wage and unemployment effects are similarly diverse for countries that are excluded
from ttip and as such suffer from trade diversion. While most of these countries are predicted to
experience a decline in real wages, some such as Switzerland, New Zealand, and Iceland do experience
a reduction in unemployment and an increase in welfare according to our Atkinson welfare criterion.
Our welfare results are obviously sensitive to the choice of welfare criterion. An alternative powerful
welfare criterion is due to Sen (1976). Annex B computes the estimated ttip welfare effects according to
Sen’s welfare criterion and compares them to the welfare changes as measured by Atkinson’s criterion.
7.2 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp) scenario
We perform the same exercise as above for an alternative free trade agreement, the so-called Trans-
Pacific Partnership (tpp) freshly agreed upon on October 5th, 2015 by 12 negotiating partners (Aus-
tralia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, Tai-
wan, Vietnam, and the United States). Real wage, unemployment, and welfare results are reported for
our sample of oecd countries in Table 5.
Note first that all potential tpp members in our sample would experience a real wage increase
(column 3, top panel), while excluded countries would feel decreasing but virtually unchanged real
wages (column 3, bottom panel). The reallocation effect is heterogeneous for both groups of countries
(column 2); this pattern is similar to the corresponding pattern of subsection 7.1. Unemployment is
predicted to fall in all participating countries and to increase slightly in non-participating countries
(column 2). As a result, the welfare effects of column 4 are unambiguously positive for participating
countries and negative for the excluded ones.
Second, in comparison to the ttip scenario, the us would benefit less from the tpp in terms of
real wages. However, as unemployment is predicted to decrease slightly under tpp, the overall welfare
effect for the us is positive under tpp, while it was negative under ttip.
Finally, trade diversion effects seem to be at work. Japan – which is excluded from ttip but is
a would-be member of tpp – would be better off under the latter (+0.2%) than under the former
agreement (+0.01%) in terms of real wage. By the same token, Canada, which experiences an almost
4%-unemployment decrease and a slight real wage increase under tpp, would also be better off than
under either the status quo or ttip (which leads to a reduction of its real wage and an increase of its
unemployment rate). By the same logic, many eu countries are made (slightly) worse-off under tpp
relative to the status quo (while most are better-off under ttip).
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7.3 The trade balance scenario
At no point in time is trade balanced in any country (Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum 2007; Eaton, Kortum,
and Neiman 2013). Our aim here is to estimate the unemployment and welfare effects of eliminating
trade imbalances. We do so by setting the trade balance of all countries in our database to zero.27
Several features of the results reported in Table 6 are noteworthy. First, our results are comparable
to real wage changes reported by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) (dek henceforth). They obtain a
change of -0.5% for the us based on its 2002 current account deficit, which is to be contrasted with our
-0.3% based on our 2008 trade deficit data. In the same way, like them, we obtain positive real wage
effects for Canada and Germany. The magnitude of the real wage effects that we find is larger than
theirs (they obtain 0.5% and 0.2%, respectively). This is likely the result of two differences between our
approach and theirs: first, the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to tariffs that we obtain from
our gravity regression, −3.17 when we include standard gravity dummies, is in line with the estimates
of Simonovska and Waugh (2014) but smaller in absolute value than the elasticity used in the published
version of dek, −8.28. Second, trade deficits are higher than current account deficits for most oecd
countries so that eliminating trade deficits requires larger corrections than eliminating current account
deficits.
Second, virtually all deficit countries experience a rise in unemployment (Italy is the only exception)
ranging from a relatively small 2% for the us to a staggering 47% for Greece and 48% for Estonia.
Closing these deficits implies reducing local consumption and, as this consumption is home-biased due
to trade costs, this hurts real wages and reduces employment. All these countries also experience a
fall in the average real wage by up to 5% in Portugal and Estonia, which yield substantial welfare
reductions.
Third, most surplus countries experience a fall in unemployment – sometimes substantial, at 71%
for Norway – and a rise in real wages (almost 5% for Norway and Ireland). But some surplus countries
– Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Japan – are made worse off.
Finally, the magnitude of the effects here are much larger than that of creating free trade areas.
This result was to be expected because some imbalances are large (Norway has a surplus of almost
20% of gdp while Greece has a deficit of 18% of gdp in 2008) while remaining trade frictions in oecd
countries are small.
8 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium model with international
trade and labor market matching frictions. The equilibrium frictional unemployment rate of each
country depends on the patterns of trade. The model features an expansion effect: when trade openness
27 We set the value of consumption equal to the value of production for each country and allow for general equilibrium
effects.
25
is associated with higher real wages, as is the case if the terms-of-trade effects are non-negative, then
such gains translate into more job openings and lower equilibrium unemployment rates. The model
also features a reallocation effect: ceteris paribus, the unemployment rate increases if the trade reform
achieves a reallocation of resources towards labor market friction-intensive sectors, and conversely if
sectors with relatively high labor market frictions contract and sectors with relatively high matching
efficiency expand following this trade reform. A companion paper (Carre`re, Fugazza, Olarreaga, and
Robert-Nicoud 2014) provides evidence for this effect.
Sector-specific labor market frictions play an important and original role in our model. We estimate
these frictions in a structural way and find that they correlate well with observed us-sectoral employ-
ment rates for which we have data. We also find that the global economic crisis that started in 2008
ended up affecting unemployment in all sectors in the same proportions, which is consistent with our
formulation of the labor market frictions.
Policymakers are usually at least equally interested in the (un)employment effects of trade reforms
as in the (real) wage effects. By explicitly allowing for equilibrium unemployment, our model addresses
such concerns head on. We emphasize the circumstances under which both the employment and the
real wage effects are aligned and – more importantly – when they are not. Such qualitative results are
insightful but incomplete. We thus introduce welfare criteria based on Atkinson (1970) (and also Sen,
1976) to arbitrage between the two effects when they work in opposite directions.
By featuring an arbitrary number of countries and sectors and being highly tractable, our model
is readily amenable to empirical applications and quantitative evaluations of fictional policy experi-
ments.We illustrate with two specific global free-trade agreements currently in the making, ttip and
tpp, and with the re-balancing of global trade imbalances. We obtain small real wage and unemploy-
ment effects in the former case and substantial effects in the latter. The model could also be used to
study the effects of other scenarios, such as ‘Brexit’ or ‘Greexit.’
A current limitation of our counterfactual exercises is that our framework, as all settings fulfilling the
conditions laid out in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012), yields small real wage effects.
Relaxing such conditions adds novel margins of adjustments and tends to yield higher estimated effects
(Arkolakis and Esposito, 2014; Head, Mayer, and Thoenig, 2014; Melitz and Redding, 2015). For
instance, the elasticity of welfare with respect to trade openness increases when accounting for input-
output linkages among sectors (Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2014). Under the assumption that
input-output coefficient are identical and constant, the reallocation effect would remain unaffected
by allowing for this extension. A natural extension of our current work would relax this Leontief
assumption by e.g. using trade-in-value-added data.
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Appendix A: Profession-specific labor market frictions
Assume that each of the K sectors in the economy combine S ≥ K different skills or occupations to
produce their output and that each worker makes a sunk occupational choice. To simplify the analysis
and make the connection with our setting in the main text more direct and straightforward, we assume
that each of the S occupations is organized as a sector that produces under perfect competition and
sells its output to the K final good sectors in a competitive fashion. In turn, each occupation hires
workers in an occupation-specific labor submarket impeded by labor market frictions.
Production
The production function of variety x in sector k is now given by
Qik(x) = ϕik(x)
S∏
s=1
Hiks(x)
aks , where
S∑
s=1
aks ≡ 1,
Hiks(x) is the mass of workers of occupation s implicated in the production of variety x in sector k,
and aks is the sector-occupation Cobb-Douglas coefficient.
The production function of occupation s is linear: its output is equal to the mass of workers being
hired in that occupation, Hs. Occupation firms face an occupation-specific cost of hiring a worker,
which is equal to
cis ≡ Pi
(
`λis
µis
) 1
1−λ
(28)
where `is is the employment rate of occupation s in country i.
Wage bargaining
Once matched, the firm and the worker bargain over a firm-occupation-specific wage for a given occu-
pation wiks(x) in order to split the rent (we abuse notations and use x here to denote the variety of
an arbitrary occupation firm). Taking all prices as given, and assuming equal bargaining weights, the
wage is then equal to
wiks(x) =
1
2
aksEik(x)
Hiks(x)
.
Firms find it optimal to hire workers until the firm-specific equilibrium wage for a worker of a given
occupation is equal to the cost of replacing the worker cis. It follows then, that all workers in a certain
occupation are paid the same occupation-specific wage which is constant across sectors:
wiks(x) = wis = cis. (29)
27
Labor market
Matching frictions are occupation-specific. Firms post vacancies in the occupation-specific job submar-
ket, so that our parameter of interest (the occupation-specific matching efficiency net of vacancy cost)
is given by µis = µ˜is/v
1−λ
is , where µis is the occupation-specific matching tfp and vis is the vacancy
cost specific to the occupation s.
Workers freely choose the occupation they want to specialize in and that choice is sunk. The
no-arbitrage condition then becomes:
wi = `iswis. (30)
Combining this expression with (28) and (29) yields:
wi
Pi
=
(
`is
µis
) 1
1−λ
. (31)
This implies that occupations with high matching efficiency µis have higher employment rate and, by
the no-arbitrage condition (30), lower wages.
It follows in turn that the ratio of any pair of occupations in any sector is constant and equal to
∀s, s˜ : Hiks
Hiks˜
=
aks
aks˜
µis
µis˜
. (32)
That is to say, firms hire relatively more workers from occupations with high matching efficiency and
a high weight in the production function. These ratios are sector-specific and exogenous.
Sectoral averages
We now proceed to aggregate wages and employment rates at the sector level (as in the model in
the main text). We show that all sector-specific quantities reflect sectoral averages of the respective
variables.
We first show that, for each sector-occupation pair, the shares of hired workers, Hiks/
∑
s˜Hiks˜, and
the shares of workers looking for work, Liks/
∑
s˜ Liks˜, are constant by (32). Specifically:
hiks ≡ Hiks∑
s˜Hiks˜
=
µisaks∑
s˜ µis˜aks˜
(33)
and
Liks
Liks˜
=
aks
aks˜
,
such that the share of workers of a given occupation s looking for work in sector k is constant and
given by:
siks ≡ Liks∑
s˜ Liks˜
= aks. (34)
Given these constant shares, we can now prove that key equilibrium conditions of our original
sector-specific model still hold in the form of sectoral averages.
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Proof of equation (13) in original model: It follows from (31) and (34) that the average
employment rate in a sector k is equal to:
¯`
ik ≡
S∑
s=1
siks`is =
(
wi
Pi
)1−λ S∑
s=1
aksµis
=
(
wi
Pi
)1−λ
µ¯ik, (35)
where µ¯ik ≡
∑
s aksµis is the average sectoral matching efficiency in equilibrium; it is constant and a
function of parameters only.
Proof of equation (12) in original model: There exists an average sectoral-wage w¯ik which is
defined as follows, and obtained by substituting in expressions (28), (29) and (33):
w¯ik ≡
S∑
s=1
hkswis =
1
µ¯ik
S∑
s=1
µisakswis
=
1
µ¯ik
P1−λi wλi .
Combining with (35) we then obtain w¯ik ¯`ik = wi.
It then follows that all of the results of the original sector-specific model hold, where the sector-
specific quantities are interpreted as sectoral averages.
Appendix B: Welfare
In this appendix we establish that (24) is the welfare criterion developed by Atkinson (1970) with a
degree to societal aversion to inequality equal to 2. We also apply the alternative criterion proposed
by Sen (1976) to our framework. Let the utility enjoyed by the unemployed be denoted by bω, where
b ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter. In our model, b is set to zero.
Atkinson (1970)
The first welfare criterion that we use to compare a counterfactual situation with the current allocation
is due to Atkinson (1970) and is extended by Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004). Atkinson’s social welfare
function can be written as a generalized average of individual utility:
W(η) ≡
[
K∑
k=1
sk`kω
1−η
k + (bω)
1−ηu
] 1
1−η
, (36)
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where η ∈ R is the relative rate of inequality aversion; η = 0 for Bentham and η = +∞ for Rawls.28
Using the no-arbitrage condition (12), we can rewrite (36) as
W(η) = ω
(
¯`
η + ub
1−η) 11−η ,
where ¯`η ≡
∑
k sk`
η
k is an inequality-adjusted measure of the employment rate (
¯`
η < ` iff η > 0).
29
We henceforth let b → 0 as in the main text. If η = 0 (Bentham) then W = ω, namely, society
cares only about the average utility. Conversely, if η → +∞ (Rawls) then maximizing W requires
minimizing the number of low income earners, i.e., minimizing u. In general, the welfare criterion in
(36) balances average real wages with (un)employment concerns and the higher η, the higher the weight
on unemployment relative to real wages. For practical purposes, we use a degree of inequality aversion,
η = 2, in between these two extremes, which yields
WCF
W
− 1 = ω
CF
ω
− u
CF
u
as in (24). We pick this particular value for η because it has empirical support and yields a simple
analytic expression. Stern (1977) finds η = 1.97 for the uk in the fiscal year 1973/4. The value η = 2
is slightly above the range [1.61− 1.72] estimated by Young (1990) from the nominal and effective us
tax schedule for years 1957, 1967, and 1977.
More generally, for any η > 1, (24) generalizes to
WCF
W
− 1 = ω
CF
ω
− 1
η − 1
uCF
u
The higher η, the higher the weight put on changes in the unemployment rate (relative to changes in
real wages). By the same token, for any η < 1, (24) becomes
WCF
W
− 1 = ω
CF
ω
+
1
1− η
¯`CF
η
¯`
η
;
the higher η, the higher the weight put on changes in the (inequality adjusted) employment rate.
Sen (1976)
An alternative welfare criterion that we may use is put forth by Sen (1976). Let
W = ω(1−G), (37)
28η > 0 and η < 0 correspond to inequality-adverse and inequality-seeking societal preferences, respectively. For η = 1,
W is equal to exp{∑ sk`k lnωk + u(ln b+ lnω)}.
29In effect, it puts a heavier weight on sectors with a low employment rate than on sectors with a high employment
rate relative to the standard arithmetic average.
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where G is the Gini coefficient of earnings inequality. This criterion satisfies several desirable proper-
ties.30 Like in (36), W is increasing in average real wages and decreasing in real wage dispersion. If
b = 0 as in the main text then
G = u+ (1− u)G`,
where G` is the Gini coefficient within the category of employed workers. It is equal to zero if all
employed workers earn the same wage, in which case the Gini coefficient G is simply the unemployment
rate u. Plugging the expression above into (37) and computing welfare changes yields
WCF
W
− 1 = ω
CF
ω
+
`CF
`
+
1−GCF`
1−G` − 3, (38)
where `CF ≡ 1 − uCF is the counterfactual employment rate. The first term in the right-hand side
above is the average real wage change; the second term accounts for changes in employed-unemployed
inequality; the final term accounts for changes in within-employed inequality. The latter two effects are
lumped together in Atkinson’s criterion. For η > 1, across group inequality dominates within group
inequality in an extreme way at the limit b = 0, which is why the within component seemingly drops
out of (24).
Another way to emphasize the similarity between Sen and Atkinson’s criteria is to consider the
special case u = ` = 1/2 and GCF` = G`. In this case, (38) and (24) yield equivalent assessment
of welfare changes. When u is lower than 1/2, as is the case empirically (see column 1 of Table 4),
Atkinson’s criterion in (24) puts a higher weight on unemployment changes than does Sen’s criterion
in (38).
In the text, we have chosen to report only one – arguably standard – value for welfare changes
in order to keep the analysis focused. Yet, our choice of Atkinson’s over Sen’s criterion is arguably
somewhat arbitrary. For illustrative purposes, we plot in Figure 4 the comparison between Atkinson’s
and Sen’s welfare criteria obtained under the ttip scenario. Juxtaposing this graph to Figure 3, it
becomes evident that Atkinson’s welfare criterion is driven by changes in unemployment, whereas Sen’s
welfare criterion by changes in real wages.
Appendix C: Gravity estimation results
Table 7 reports the results of our gravity regressions. The estimated coefficients are line with those of
the literature (Head and Mayer 2014).
30In addition to some standard axioms such as Complete Ordering, Convex Preferences, or Strict Monotonicity, this
criterion satisfies the ‘Rank Order Weighting’ axiom whereby the weight of the richest person in the social welfare
function is 1/n of the weight given to the nth richest person. In general, using this criterion to compare allocations under
different vectors of prices is problematic (as with all social welfare functions). In our case, the marginal utility of income
is constant and the ranking in the population follows the the ranking of the µk’s, which are time invariant.
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Appendix D: Methodology for counterfactual exercises
This Appendix provides the methodology for the three counterfactual exercises (ttip, tpp, and tb)
reported in Section 7. Under each scenario, we compute the counterfactual wages, prices, and vectors
of shares of workers allocated to each sector in each country (wCFi , PCFi , and {sCFik }k, respectively)
taking account of general equilibrium effects. This implies in particular that we allow the vector of
exporter-sector unobservables obtained in the gravity regression, κˆik, to change endogenously within
each policy experiment. We perform our calculations by iteration using Matlab.
Counterfactual values under fta scenarios (ttip and tpp)
Let xˆ define the estimate of any variable x obtained under the gravity regression in section 6.4. With the
estimates δˆx, θˆ, and κˆik at hand, we proceed to estimate counterfactual fta bilateral trade flows relative
to the current equilibrium (EFTAijk /Eijk) for a set of 116 countries for which sufficient data is available. To
this end we further need (i) the counterfactual trade costs, (ii) estimates of countrywide expenditures,
Ej, (iii) estimates of the counterfactual countrywide expenditures, E
FTA
j , and (iv) exporter-sector
unobservables, κFTAik ’s, which we obtain as follows:
(i) Counterfactual trade costs under the fta are set such that
tariffFTAijk =
{
0 if i, j are members of the same FTA
tijk otherwise
and we set the rta dummy to one among fta members.
(ii) Trade balances in general equilibrium so we calibrate the vector of country-level production
values, Ei, to minimize the sum of squares of the excess demands,
EDi ≡
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(
tˆijk
Tˆjk
)−θ
αkEj − Ei, (39)
where tˆijk = τˆijkκˆik and Tˆjk = (
∑
i′ tˆ
−θ
i′jk)
−1/θ by (19). Let KN denote the set of non-tradable goods and
services and KT denote the complementary set of tradables. For all k ∈ KN we impose tjjk/Tjk = 1
for all j and tijk/Tjk = +∞ for all i 6= j. Consumption shares αk are calculated as sectoral production
shares for the entire oecd region, using sector-level production data from the oecd Stan database.
We use calibrated rather than actual values for E because we run our counterfactual exercise under
the assumption that the macroeconomic sources of trade imbalances remain constant. We calibrate the
vector E ≡
[
E1 ... EI
]′
so as to minimize the following sum of squares: EC = arg min
∑
i(EDi/Ei)
2,
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where the ‘C’ superscript stands for ‘calibrated’.31 As a validation of this procedure, we compare the
estimated vector of ECi to the actual GDP values in 2008 as reported by imf. The correlation is 0.655
between ECi and nominal GDP (116 countries), and 0.94 between E
C
i and the nominal GDP corrected
for trade imbalances (105 countries).
(iii) Trade balances in the fta equilibrium if
EDFTAi ≡
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(
tFTAijk
T FTAjk
)−θ
αkE
FTA
j − EFTAi (40)
is equal to zero, all i.
Let x˜ ≡ xFTA/x define the ratio of the counterfactual and actual values of any variable x. Here
is how we compute the variables labelled with the superscript fta in the expression above. First,
we assume that the sources of macroeconomic imbalances are constant so that E˜j = E˜
C
j , namely,
counterfactual changes of E are equiproportional to changes in EC and EFTAj = E˜j × ECj . Second,
tFTAijk = tˆijkτ˜ijkκ˜ik by (18) and (26). Using the latter, it turns out that the ratio κ˜ is origin-specific
(more on this below) and so we write tFTAijk = tˆijkτ˜ijkκ˜i. Finally, the gravity variables other than the
RTAij dummy are time-invariant; therefore,
τ˜ijk =
{
1
1+tariffijk
eδˆrta if i, j ∈ {fta member}
1 otherwise.
(41)
Using these relationships, we rewrite (40) as
EDFTAi ≡
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(
tˆijkτ˜ijkκ˜i∑
i′ tˆi′jkτ˜i′jkκ˜i′
)−θ
αkE
C
j E˜j − ECi E˜i, (42)
where the tˆijk’s are the same as in (39) and the E
C
i ’s are the excess-demand minimizing Ei’s of (39).
The unknowns here are the I-dimensional vector E˜ and the κ˜. So far we have twice as many unknowns
as equations.
(iv) Under the assumption that the technology parameters µik and ϕik are time invariant, the ratio
κ˜j simplifies to κ˜j = w˜
λ
j P˜
1−λ
j by definition of κjk in (26). Income being proportional to wages in our
Ricardian model, we obtain w˜i = E˜i and thus
κ˜i = E˜
λ
i P˜1−λi .
31We may rewrite (39) in matrix form as ED = (T− I)E, where ED and E are the I-dimensional vectors stacking
up the EDi’s and the Ei’s, I is the identity matrix, and T is an I × I matrix, the typical element of which is equal to∑
k(tijk/Tjk)
−θαk. Generically, there exists no vector E that solves ED = 0. Such a vector would be the eigenvector
of T associated with the unit eigenvalue of T but, generically, the eigenvalues of E are different from one. Indeed, the
eigenvalues of T, denoted by ψ ∈ C, are the solutions to the I-dimensional polynomial det(T− ψI) = 0 but ψ = 1 is not
one of its roots in general.
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In the trade equilibrium, the price index is equal to Pi = γ
∏
k
[∑
j(τjikκik)
−θ
]−αk/θ
. Using the tilde
notation for prices as well as (41), we may rewrite the expression above as eκ˜i = 0, where the ‘e’ in eκ˜i
stands for ‘error’ or ‘excess’ by analogy with EDi in (40), and
eκ˜i ≡ E˜λˆi P˜1−λˆi − κ˜i = E˜λˆi
K∏
k=1
[∑J
j=1 (τˆijkκˆjkτ˜ijkκ˜j)
−θ∑J
j=1 (τˆijkκˆjk)
−θ
]−αk
θ
(1−λˆ)
− κ˜i, (43)
where λˆ = 0.6 and τijk = +∞ for all k ∈ KN and i 6= j. The 2I unknowns of this system are the
vectors E˜ and κ˜.
We jointly estimate E˜ and κ˜ by minimizing the sum of squares of EDFTAi /Ei in (42) and of eκ˜i in
(43). This being a high-dimensional non-linear system, we do this by iterations using Matlab.
We can now compute the general equilibrium effects on domestic flows and on the bilateral trade
flows in tradable good sectors by using the counterfactual trade cost ratios from (41) and the estimated
ratios E˜ and κ˜:
E˜ijk =

τ˜−θˆijk κ˜
−θˆ
i
∑I
i′=1[τˆi′jkκˆi′k]
−θˆ
∑I
i′=1[τˆi′jkκˆi′k τ˜i′jkκ˜i′ ]
−θˆ E˜j if k ∈ KT
E˜i if k ∈ KN and j = i
0 if k ∈ KN and j 6= i
(44)
The simplicity of this expression for k ∈ KN arises because domestic production is linear in domestic
income by virtue of homogeneous preferences.
The counterfactual fta labor shares are equal to
sFTAik =
∑J
j=1EijkE˜ijk∑K
k′=1
∑J
j=1Eijk′E˜ijk′
, (45)
where the Eijk’s denote actual trade and domestic flows.
The change in the employment rates under the new free-trade agreement equilibrium is now an
interaction of both the expansion effect and the reallocation effect. It can be obtained as
`FTAi
`i
=
(
E˜i
P˜i
)1−λ∑
k s
FTA
ik µk∑
k sikµk
. (46)
Counterfactual values under balanced trade (tb)
Our aim here is to estimate the unemployment and welfare effects of eliminating trade imbalances.
The estimation procedure of previous subsection remains valid, with the exception that under the
trade balance scenario all tariffs remain unchanged.
We use Ei to denote aggregate demand of country i and Yi its output, and we define bi ≡ Ei/Yi.
Thus 1− bi is i’s trade balance (exports minus imports) as a share of output. Therefore, bi > 1 holds
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in deficit countries and bi ∈ (0, 1) holds in surplus countries. We may thus write the equivalent of (39)
as
EDi ≡
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(
tˆijk
Tˆjk
)−θ
αkEj − Ei
bi
.
We compute bi from trade balance and gdp data. As in the previous subsection, we estimate the vector
ETB as ETB = arg min
∑
i(EDi/Ei)
2.
Next, let us define x˜ ≡ xTB/x as the ratio of the counterfactual to the actual values of any variable
x, where now the counterfactual situation is one where trade imbalances are eliminated throughout
the world. We thus set bTBi = 1, all i so that b˜i ≡ bTBi /bi = 1/bi. Tariffs and all gravity variables are
unchanged and hence τ˜ijk = 1 for all i, j, k. The excess demand system in this counterfactual world is
isomorphic to (42):
EDTBi ≡
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(
tˆijkκ˜i∑
i′ tˆi′jkκ˜i′
)−θ
αkE
TB
j E˜j − ETBi E˜i. (47)
By the same token, the system of ‘excess-κ˜’ is equal to
eκ˜i = E˜
λˆ
i
K∏
k=1
[∑J
j=1 (τˆijkκˆjkκ˜j)
−θ∑J
j=1 (τˆijkκˆjk)
−θ
]−αk
θ
(1−λˆ)
− κ˜i. (48)
We solve for the vectors E and κ˜ that jointly minimize the sums of squares in (47) and (48).
Finally, we compute the counterfactual (balanced trade) trade flows, labor shares, and the employ-
ment rates as in (44), (45), and
`TBi
`i
=
(
E˜i
P˜i
)1−λ∑
k s
TB
ik µk∑
k sikµk
, (49)
respectively.
Appendix E: Unemployment and welfare results for different
values of λ
Table 8 reports unemployment and welfare results for our three different counterfactuals (TTIP, TPP
and trade imbalance elimination) for values of the matching elasticity λ corresponding to the lower
bound (λ = 0.3) and the upper bound (λ = 0.9) reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The
results for ttip and tpp are quite insensitive to these alternative assumptions about the value of λ,
both qualitatively and quantitatively. By contrast, unemployment and welfare figures switch signs for
most countries in between these two extremes for the trade rebalancing experiment. This was to be
expected because real wages are greatly affected in this policy experiment and different values of λ
correspond to different weights put on ω in the computation of both u and W. Two further features of
the figures reported in table 8 are to be expected by inspection of (23). First, the lower the value of λ,
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the higher the negative correlation between unemployment and real wage changes. Second, the figures
reported in the text belong to the intervals consisting of the figures in table 8. These thus provide
bounds to the welfare and unemployment effects of our policy experiments.
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Figures
Figure 1: Estimated sector-specific labor market matching efficiencies (µk’s) with 90% confidence in-
tervals, for 15 aggregate sectors with available unemployment rate data
41
Figure 2: Correlation between the estimated µk’s and the us employment rates for 12 blsmanufacturing
sectors
Note: Figure shows the linear fit between matching efficiencies estimated for our oecd-25 sample of
countries and the US sectoral employment data (sourced from the us Bureau of Labor Statistics)
for 12 manufacturing sectors for which sector-specific employment data was available, for years
2007-2009.
42
Figure 3: Relative changes in unemployment levels and real income for members and non-members of
ttip
Note: Figure based on the results in Table 4. The ‘iso-welfare’ line splits the sample into welfare-
gaining countries (above the line) and welfare-losing countries (below the line).
43
Figure 4: Relative welfare changes under the ttip scenario according to Sen’s and Atkinson’s criteria
44
Tables
Table 1: Availability of isicrev3 sector-specific unemployment data (kilm database)
15 aggregated sectors 21 disaggregated manufacturing sectors
(available unemployment rate data) (unavailable unemployment rate data)
ISICRev3 Sector description ISICRev3 Sector description
1-2 Agriculture, hunting and forestry 15-16 Food, beverages and tabacco products
5 Fishing 17 Textiles
10-14 Mining and quarrying 18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur
15-37 Manufacturing 19 Leather, leather products and footwear
40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply 20 Wood and products of wood and cork
45 Construction 21 Pulp, paper and paper products
50-52 Wholesale and retail trade - repairs 22 Printing and publishing
55 Hotels and restaurants 23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
60-63 Transport, storage and communications 24 Chemicals and chemical products
65-67 Financial intermediation 25 Rubber and plastics products
70-74 Real estate, renting and business activities 26 Other non-metallic mineral products
75 Public admin. and defence - social security 27 Basic metals
80 Education 28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equip.
85 Health and social work 29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
90-95 Other community, social and personal services 30 Office, accounting and computing machinery
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
32 Radio, television and communication equipment
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Other transport equipment
36-37 Other miscellaneous manufacturing
45
Table 2: Estimates of sector-specific labor market matching efficiencies, µik
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clustered
ISICRev3 Sector description µk Std. Err.
1-2 Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.962 0.0013
5 Fishing 0.984 0.0019
10-14 Mining and quarrying 0.991 0.0010
15-16 Food, beverages and tabacco products 0.921 0.0400
17 Textiles 1.462 0.1854
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 0.062 0.1066
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 1.442 0.2986
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.033 0.2772
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 1.316 0.0990
22 Printing and publishing 1.490 0.1659
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.852 0.0470
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.973 0.0579
25 Rubber and plastics products 0.587 0.3103
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 1.492 0.2952
27 Basic metals 1.161 0.0834
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1.409 0.1728
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 1.221 0.0450
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 1.303 0.1961
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 1.299 0.0653
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 0.877 0.0397
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.606 0.3735
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.995 0.0438
35 Other transport equipment 0.719 0.2279
36-37 Other miscellaneous manufacturing 0.662 0.1625
40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply 1.013 0.0005
45 Construction 0.965 0.0006
50-52 Wholesale and retail trade - repairs 0.981 0.0010
55 Hotels and restaurants 0.942 0.0010
60-63 Transport, storage and communications 0.998 0.0006
65-67 Financial intermediation 1.013 0.0006
70-74 Real estate, renting and business activities 0.985 0.0005
75 Public admin. and defence - compulsory social security 1.006 0.0010
80 Education 1.011 0.0010
85 Health and social work 1.005 0.0011
90-95 Other community, social and personal services 0.976 0.0010
Note: The table displays estimates of matching efficiencies for 35 sectors classified according to ISICRev3. Columns 1 and
2 report the ISICRev3 classification code and sector description, and columns 3 and 4 report the coefficient estimates and
the clustered (product) standard errors, respectively. Estimates are obtained using non-linear least squares on a sample of
25 oecd countries for the period 2001-2008 (1,624 observations).
Table 3: Correlation between estimated matching efficiencies and us sectoral employment rates for the
disaggregated manufacturing sectors
Correlation Spearman correlation
2005 0.676 0.634
2006 0.648 0.595
2007 0.741 0.709
2008 0.659 0.666
2009 0.558 0.538
Note: Table displays the correlation and the Spearman correlation between
matching efficiencies estimated for our oecd-25 sample of countries and the us
sectoral employment data (sourced from the us Bureau of Labor Statistics)
for 12 manufacturing sectors for which sector-specific employment data is
available.
Table 4: Changes in unemployment rate, real wage, and welfare under ttip.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
u2008i
(∑
k s
TTIP
ik µk∑
k s
2008
ik µk
− 1
) (
uTTIPi
u2008i
− 1
) (
ωTTIP
ω2008
− 1
) (
WTTIP
W2008
− 1
)
TTIP Austria 3.8 0.021 -1.421 0.087 1.509
members Belgium 7.0 -0.057 0.713 0.010 -0.704
Czech Rep. 4.4 -0.007 -1.014 0.133 1.147
Denmark 3.4 0.017 -1.430 0.082 1.512
Estonia 5.5 -0.023 -1.293 0.247 1.540
Finland 6.3 -0.024 -1.267 0.275 1.542
France 7.4 -0.042 0.036 0.098 0.062
Germany 7.5 -0.010 0.020 0.022 0.002
Greece 7.7 0.005 -1.389 0.277 1.667
Hungary 7.8 0.037 -1.235 0.168 1.402
Ireland 4.6 -0.260 3.133 0.272 -2.861
Italy 6.7 -0.034 0.197 0.050 -0.147
Netherlands 2.8 -0.035 1.103 0.008 -1.095
Poland 7.1 0.003 -0.821 0.150 0.971
Portugal 7.7 0.006 -1.560 0.311 1.870
Slovenia 4.4 -0.021 -1.235 0.195 1.430
Spain 8.4 -0.062 -1.946 0.604 2.549
Sweden 6.3 0.002 -1.335 0.220 1.555
United Kingdom 5.4 -0.021 -1.492 0.266 1.758
EU-19 Average 6.7 -0.025 -0.557 0.168 0.725
United States 5.9 -0.172 1.100 0.259 -0.841
Other Canada 6.3 -0.008 1.011 -0.150 -1.160
oecd Iceland 3.0 0.027 -0.214 -0.050 0.163
Israel 6.1 0.000 0.070 -0.011 -0.080
Japan 4.0 -0.005 0.115 0.001 -0.114
Mexico 3.5 -0.028 1.365 -0.053 -1.418
New Zealand 3.9 0.009 -0.209 -0.001 0.208
Norway 2.6 0.005 0.413 -0.039 -0.452
Switzerland 3.4 0.029 -0.689 -0.013 0.676
Note: All values are in %. Column 1 reports the national unemployment rate (source: ilo). Columns 2-5 report
results of a simulation based on 116 countries for which sufficient data was available in year 2008, and where the
matching elasticity is set to λ = 0.6. Column 2 is the ‘reallocation effect’; Column 3 is the relative change in the
unemployment rate; it is a weighted sum of the reallocation and expansion effects of Columns 2 and 4 by equations
(21) or (46). Column 4 is the relative change in real wage; and Column 5 is the relative change in welfare obtained
using Columns 3 and 4 according to the welfare criterion in (24). eu average reports averages weighted by population
for 19 eu countries in our sample. Caution is required when interpreting results for New Zealand, Israel, and Ireland
due to limited data on sectoral production shares (16, 17 and 24 sectors available out of 35, respectively).
Table 5: Changes in unemployment rate, real wage, and welfare under tpp.
(1) (2) (3) (4)(∑
k s
TPP
ik µk∑
k s
2008
ik µk
− 1
) (
uTPPi
u2008i
− 1
) (
ωTPP
ω2008
− 1
) (
WTPP
W2008
− 1
)
TPP Canada 0.002 -3.897 0.650 4.547
members Japan 0.133 -4.684 0.155 4.839
Mexico 0.001 -2.344 0.211 2.555
New Zealand -0.241 -5.247 1.142 6.390
United States -0.006 -0.248 0.053 0.301
EU-19 Austria -0.003 0.112 -0.004 -0.116
Belgium -0.001 0.015 0.000 -0.016
Czech Rep. -0.001 0.070 -0.006 -0.076
Denmark 0.000 0.046 -0.003 -0.049
Estonia -0.003 0.080 -0.005 -0.085
Finland -0.001 0.093 -0.012 -0.105
France -0.003 0.049 -0.003 -0.052
Germany 0.001 -0.012 -0.001 0.011
Greece -0.002 0.099 -0.016 -0.115
Hungary 0.001 0.025 -0.008 -0.034
Ireland 0.010 -0.150 -0.006 0.144
Italy -0.001 0.022 -0.003 -0.025
Netherlands -0.003 0.098 0.000 -0.099
Norway 0.002 0.097 -0.012 -0.108
Poland -0.002 0.069 -0.007 -0.076
Portugal -0.007 0.118 -0.008 -0.126
Slovenia -0.001 0.088 -0.009 -0.096
Spain -0.001 0.047 -0.007 -0.055
Sweden 0.000 0.058 -0.010 -0.068
United Kingdom 0.001 0.029 -0.005 -0.035
EU-19 Average -0.001 0.037 -0.005 -0.042
Other Iceland 0.010 0.424 -0.059 -0.483
oecd Israel -0.001 0.057 -0.006 -0.063
Switzerland -0.001 0.052 -0.002 -0.055
Note: All values are in %. The table reports results of a simulation based on 116 countries for which sufficient data
was available in year 2008. The matching elasticity is set to λ = 0.6. Column 1 is the ‘reallocation effect’; Column
2 is the relative change in the unemployment rate calculated as the weighted sum of columns 1 and 3 according to
equations (21) or (46); Column 3 is the relative change in real wage; and column 4 is the relative change in welfare
obtained using columns 2 and 3 according to equation (24). ‘eu-19 Average’ reports averages weighted by population
for the 19 eu countries in our sample. Caution is required when interpreting results for New Zealand, Israel, and
Ireland due to limited data on sectoral production shares (16, 17 and 24 sectors available out of 35, respectively).
Table 6: Changes in employment and unemployment rates with trade balanced throughout the world.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
bi =
Ei
Yi
( ∑
k s
TB
ik µk∑
k s
2008
ik µk
− 1
) (
uTBi
u2008i
− 1
) (
ωTB
ω2008
− 1
) (
WTB
W2008
− 1
)
b < 1 Austria 0.992 0.10 1.15 -0.33 -1.48
(surplus) Canada 0.972 0.00 -8.24 1.23 9.48
Czech Rep. 0.999 0.14 2.90 -0.62 -3.52
Denmark 0.997 0.05 4.45 -0.47 -4.92
Finland 0.932 0.02 -9.62 1.40 11.01
Germany 0.927 -0.49 -2.71 1.59 4.30
Ireland 0.834 -1.28 -17.78 4.88 22.65
Japan 0.989 -0.19 1.77 0.25 -1.52
Netherlands 0.938 0.06 -20.15 1.15 21.31
Norway 0.813 -0.12 -70.94 4.53 75.47
Sweden 0.946 0.01 -6.87 1.01 7.89
Switzerland 0.951 0.11 -13.56 0.81 14.37
b > 1 Belgium 1.027 0.09 6.47 -1.27 -7.74
(deficit) Estonia 1.116 -0.40 47.84 -5.25 -53.10
France 1.026 0.08 5.44 -1.15 -6.58
Greece 1.183 -0.15 46.65 -8.13 -54.78
Hungary 1.009 0.17 1.50 -0.66 -2.17
Iceland 1.056 0.76 23.44 -3.24 -26.68
Israel 1.030 -0.11 8.83 -1.04 -9.87
Italy 1.001 0.13 -1.07 -0.11 0.96
Mexico 1.016 0.11 3.09 -0.49 -3.58
New Zealand 1.016 -0.14 10.57 -0.64 -11.21
Poland 1.058 0.28 12.98 -2.80 -15.78
Portugal 1.129 0.12 26.09 -5.03 -31.12
Slovenia 1.050 0.51 10.13 -2.15 -12.28
Spain 1.078 0.72 4.07 -2.39 -6.46
United Kingdom 1.062 0.46 6.89 -1.89 -8.78
United States 1.057 0.00 1.92 -0.27 -2.19
EU-19 Avg. 1.014 0.10 3.64 -0.90 -4.54
Sample Avg. 1.021 0.03 2.09 -0.43 -2.52
Note: Values in columns 2-5 are in %. Column 1 gives the trade imbalance in goods for year 2008 (source: imf). Columns 2-5 report results
of a simulation based on 105 countries for which sufficient data was available in year 2008, and where the matching elasticity is set to λ = 0.6.
Column 2 is the “reallocation effect”; Column 3 is the relative change in the unemployment rate calculated as the weighted sum of columns 2 and
4 according to equations (21) or (49); Column 4 is the relative change in real wage; and column 5 is the relative change in welfare obtained using
columns 3 and 4 according to equation (24). eu and sample averages correspond to the averages weighted by population for 19 eu and 28 oecd
countries in our sample, respectively. Caution is required when interpreting results for New Zealand, Israel, and Ireland due to limited data on
sectoral production shares (16, 17 and 24 sectors available out of 35, respectively).
Table 7: Gravity estimates
Coeff. Coeff.
ln(1+tariff) -4.34 -3.17
(0.205) (0.174)
ln(D) -1.59 -1.30
(ln distance) (0.013) (0.015)
CONT 0.66
(Contiguity) (0.034)
LANG 0.62
(Common language) (0.023)
COLON 0.78
(Common colonial exp.) (0.034)
CURR 0.18
(Common currency) (0.048)
RTA 0.52
(0.028)
obs. 198,755 198,755
FE exporter-product yes yes
FE importer-product yes yes
Note: Table reports results of a gravity estimation using 181 exporter-countries,
139 importer-countries and 24 ISICRev3 tradable sectors for the year 2008.
Two-way clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. All coefficients
are statistically different from zero at the 1% level.
Table 8: Changes in unemployment rates and welfare for different values of matching elasticity λ.
TTIP TPP TB(
uTTIPi
u2008i
− 1
) (
WTTIP
W2008
− 1
) (
uTPPi
u2008i
− 1
) (
WTPP
W2008
− 1
) (
uTBi
u2008i
− 1
) (
WTB
W2008
− 1
)
λ =→ 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9
AUT -3.59 -0.68 3.761 0.740 0.18 0.08 -0.183 -0.081 9.00 -2.13 -9.65 1.91
BEL 0.57 0.75 -0.545 -0.748 0.00 0.02 -0.003 -0.020 21.12 -0.01 -23.50 -0.85
CAN 2.47 0.28 -2.693 -0.386 -12.48 -0.68 13.669 1.130 -22.84 -1.26 25.03 2.12
CHE -0.40 -0.82 0.383 0.811 -0.01 0.07 0.004 -0.070 -34.04 -4.75 35.58 5.30
CZE -3.79 -0.05 4.050 0.141 0.16 0.03 -0.169 -0.030 14.94 -2.20 -16.13 1.79
DEU -0.25 0.11 0.292 -0.093 0.00 -0.02 0.000 0.015 -20.34 4.77 23.41 -3.70
DNK -3.73 -0.65 3.895 0.707 0.05 0.04 -0.058 -0.038 16.37 -0.70 -17.25 0.38
ESP -8.38 0.25 9.566 0.152 0.09 0.02 -0.106 -0.029 28.61 -6.10 -33.29 4.50
EST -5.34 0.12 5.814 0.051 0.09 0.06 -0.093 -0.068 122.53 12.89 -100.00 -16.52
FIN -5.11 0.09 5.641 0.098 0.18 0.04 -0.194 -0.051 -27.44 -1.75 30.06 2.70
FRA -1.15 0.44 1.346 -0.376 0.07 0.04 -0.071 -0.041 18.65 -0.11 -20.89 -0.67
GBR -6.05 0.06 6.573 0.121 0.09 0.00 -0.097 -0.003 37.59 -5.96 -41.26 4.69
GRC -4.45 -0.29 4.975 0.477 0.21 0.04 -0.237 -0.052 132.22 8.55 -100.00 -14.10
HUN -3.14 -0.57 3.470 0.687 0.09 -0.01 -0.098 0.001 9.71 -1.54 -11.12 1.11
IRL -2.34 5.01 2.873 -4.823 -0.03 -0.20 0.018 0.200 -100.00 20.46 109.05 -17.13
ISL 1.04 -0.76 -1.124 0.729 1.82 -0.19 -1.916 0.149 111.50 -17.07 -100.00 14.84
ISR 0.21 0.01 -0.229 -0.022 0.11 0.03 -0.117 -0.032 24.74 2.68 -26.87 -3.36
ITA -0.50 0.43 0.603 -0.395 0.04 0.01 -0.041 -0.016 0.51 -1.66 -0.74 1.59
JPN 0.10 0.13 -0.100 -0.125 -8.84 -3.35 9.159 3.454 -4.08 4.07 4.60 -3.91
MEX 2.45 0.89 -2.538 -0.923 -8.18 -0.40 8.598 0.536 16.94 -2.20 -17.96 1.88
NLD 0.82 1.19 -0.798 -1.182 0.06 0.11 -0.063 -0.112 -57.26 -4.82 59.52 5.60
NOR 1.47 -0.07 -1.537 0.037 0.36 -0.05 -0.373 0.041 -100.00 -6.90 108.64 9.97
NZL -0.14 -0.23 0.137 0.225 -33.36 4.13 35.644 -3.369 25.00 4.48 -26.24 -4.91
POL -2.68 -0.17 2.968 0.270 0.12 0.04 -0.131 -0.047 45.12 -1.26 -50.36 -0.65
PRT -5.21 -0.32 5.827 0.532 0.16 0.10 -0.169 -0.101 80.85 2.69 -90.51 -6.09
SVN -5.24 0.18 5.616 -0.050 0.20 0.03 -0.214 -0.033 52.52 -8.03 -56.64 6.58
SWE -4.51 -0.24 4.944 0.392 0.15 0.01 -0.163 -0.019 -20.01 -1.17 21.94 1.85
USA -2.94 2.48 3.448 -2.302 -1.24 -0.03 1.355 0.066 5.80 0.26 -6.32 -0.45
Note: All values are in %. Table reports results of simulations for ttip and tpp counterfactuals (116 countries) and
the tb counterfactual (105 countries) for 2008 baseline year using lower and upper bounds of lambda (0.3 and 0.9,
respectively). Values below -100% have been rounded to -100%.
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